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The measurement problem in QM:
two comments and a new approach
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Abstract: The identification of ‘measurement’ in QM as a human action is a source
of profound confusion. We propose an approach to the measurement problem based
on a reconsideration of the nature of particles.
March 3, 2020
1 Measurement is not just by humans
John Bell, in his article ‘Against Measurement’ [1], was right to deplore the way the
way the word ‘measurement’ is applied in physics. But he did not lay stress on the
way in which the common application of the word makes it impossible to disassociate
certain natural processes from human agency. Such a natural process is the creation of
pleochroic haloes as described below. This is a process, exhibiting key characteristics of
a measurement, that has been occurring since long before the appearance of humans.
The fact that ‘measurement’ in common usage suggests pre-existing properties is a
somewhat separate issue.
We first consider an idealized experiment that might be performed in the absence of
gravity, on the ISS perhaps. A nucleus of 238U is somehow levitated alone at the center
of a sphere the inner surface of which can detect swift charged particles: leaving a
spot. After a wait, the nucleus will undergo α decay. This can be described in terms
of an S-wave (l = 0) representing an entangled pair, a nucleus of 4He and a recoiling
nucleus of 234Th. The conventional description of alpha decay is in terms of a wave
function for the relative 4He – 234Th coordinate; the centre of mass coordinate does
not appear. The entanglement is formally more apparent when the wave function is
expanded as a sum of products of α-particle and 234Th coordinates; a basis in which the
α-particle is in a quite well-defined direction, is possible. For a useful detailed account
of the entanglement of two-particle systems, in the context of the hydrogen atom, see
Refs. [2, 3].
A spot will appear on the detecting surface as the alpha particle hits it. It can then
be predicted with certainty that a second spot will very soon afterward appear on the
exact opposite location on the spherical detecting surface. The second spot records
the arrival of the thorium nucleus. This whole process places a natural event in a
very artificial setup, but it is, in essence, something that occurs everywhere and all the
time. It is not insignificant since, as Feynman has noted [4], such events make history
strictly unpredictable. But what occurs in this staged situation involves the essence
of what is called ‘measurement’ in the context of quantum mechanics. Somehow, the
transformation of an S-wave (more strictly, something described by an S-wave) into
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a spot (strictly, a highly localized region where a detecting surface has changed its
physical nature); a process sometimes called an ‘expansion into the macroscopic world’
has taken place. There has not been a human measurer in sight. Yet, we commonly
read, in defence of Qbism, for example, that a measurement can be understood in
terms of the change in the understanding of a human observer. This is a measure of
the extent that ‘measure’ has become entangled with measuring by humans.
The S-wave is isotropic and, moreover, the 238U ground state nucleus has zero spin,
thus having no spatial orientation. Thus the alpha particles from many such nuclei at
the centre of the sphere would leave an isotropic set of spots. Each associated recoiling
234Th would always hit the screen in the exact opposite position to the corresponding
alpha spot.
Of course, someone is going to argue that the spots only appear much later when a
person inspects the detecting surface of the sphere. Such a someone is also obliged, of
course, to claim that the pleochroic haloes, which are found [5] surrounding uranium-
or thorium-bearing inclusions in mica, only occur when the mica is examined in the
laboratory. The haloes of course, are literally as old as the hills. Arguably, then, the
situation deplored by Bell might be considered even worse. It is surely time that dis-
cussions of measurement in quantum mechanics should treat all situations that involve
the process that is commonly described as the collapse of the wave packet, or expan-
sion into the macroscopic domain. Most such situations involve no human activity and
appear to involve a departure from unitary evolution of a wave packet. Whatever the
deeper ontology that might eventually emerge, the idea of a wave packet collapsing
does, after all, seem a fair way of characterizing the transformation of something rep-
resented by an entangled S-wave, of 4pi angular reach, into something characterized by
two spots on precisely opposite sides of a spherical detecting surface.
Arguably, we need a new word to replace ‘measurement’. Perhaps ‘actualization’ or ‘ac-
tualize’ would indicate something that the system does rather than something a person
does, as is suggested by ‘measurement’. It is unclear to this author how spontaneous
collapse models lead to actualization in the instant that the particle wave function en-
counters the detecting sphere, leaving, in the present case, two spots on exact opposite
points on a sphere.
2 Two slits or one?
We now argue that Einstein’s 1927 single hole experiment (Ref. [6] and see below) gets
closer to the central mysteries of quantum mechanics than Feynman’s two slits. Richard
Feynman famously declared that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics are exposed in
the two slit experiment. In introducing the two slit experiment, he said: ‘I will take just
this one experiment, which has been designed to contain all the mysteries of quantum
mechanics, to put you up against the paradoxes and mysteries and peculiarities of
nature one hundred percent.’ [7]. He went on to say: ‘Any other situation in nature,
it turns out, can always be explained by saying “remember the case of the experiment
with the two holes? It’s the same thing.” ’ [7] He pointed out that the electrons or
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photons behave as waves in that they give rise to a diffraction pattern, and as particles
when they each arrive at a single spot on the detecting screen; in his words: ‘Electrons
behave in this respect in exactly the same way as photons; they are both screwy, but
in exactly the same way.’ [8] We can agree with that, but the unique role of the two
slit experiment can be questioned.
Many didactic accounts of quantum mechanics introduce the same two slit example,
and it is certainly true that it is a fine illustration of a fundamental and characteristic
quantum property, the superposition of amplitudes and the need to add amplitudes
before squaring. It also leads to a discussion of wave particle duality. According to the
so-called Copenhagen interpretation, attributed to Bohr (but widely applied in a form
due more to Heisenberg [9]), wave-like and particle-like properties are complementary,
so the two slit experiment exemplifies this. If you ask where a single electron or photon
arrives, you get a particle-like answer: at a single place. But the distribution of places of
individual electrons or photons is wave-like: the two-slit diffraction pattern, effectively
an interference pattern corresponding to interference between the amplitudes for going
through one slit or the other. Thus wave-like and particle-like properties appear in a
single experiment.
But is it really true that the two slit problem contains ‘... all the mysteries of quantum
mechanics ...’? Electrons, photons, or Bucky balls for that matter, are still described
by a wave function or wave packet even if one slit is closed. So, is one slit diffraction
just as good an exemplar of complementarity? Students should be encouraged to do
thought experiments, and one by Galileo is inspirational. Two separate falling balls
would not, if joined together, fall faster as a result. A faster drop would be in accord
with Aristotelian physics in which heavier objects fall faster. Imagine then moving the
two slits, step by step, closer together: the diffraction pattern will change continuously
as the slits approach each other. Eventually, they will become a single slit, and there
will be a single slit diffraction pattern in which particles appear according to the laws
of single slit (or single hole) diffraction. But nothing deep has changed. Those who
like Bohr’s complementarity can still have it. There are still particles (appearing)
and still waves (determining their distribution). The single slit, or hole, experiment
was actually done in 1910 by Taylor [10] with very low intensity light; the diffraction
pattern appeared, spot by spot, with light of an intensity that we can now interpret as
‘one photon at a time’.
In fact, it was the single slit (or single hole) case that was the basis of Einstein’s
declaration in 1927, see Ref. [6], that quantum mechanics is incomplete; unless, that is,
some interpretation like that of de Broglie (later the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) theory)
was applied. When de Broglie’s interpretation dipped out of fashion, Einstein persisted
in his belief in the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. Thus EPR [11] devised their
famous argument, involving two particles, to demonstrate this incompleteness. As
we all know, Bell [12] later showed that their model implied just what Einstein most
abhorred: non-locality or non-separability. Ironically, for two particles the later dBB
theory is also highly non-local, and is therefore very problematical as a salvation for
Einstein’s 1927 example. Thus, it is single slit diffraction that most directly exhibits
the deepest mysteries of QM pace Feynman: non-locality and (at least apparent) wave
function collapse. Regarding collapse, whatever your ontology of the wave packet, the
3
wave packet for the single particle leaving the slit or hole no longer exists after the spot
appears on the screen. That applies to both ‘wave packet’ in the logical category of
elements of a formalism, or in the category of whatever physical entities are described
by that formalism. The non-locality implicit in the conventional (collapse) model of
single slit diffraction does not permit faster than light communication for reasons widely
discussed in connection with the EPR situation.
Notwithstanding the above, the two slit experiment is valuable for teaching the super-
position principle. In fact, as Jammer points out [13], the double slit initially appeared
to be a stumbling block for Born’s interpretation.
Here is another quote from Feynman: ‘A philosopher once said “It is necessary for
the very existence of science that the same conditions always produce the same re-
sult”. Well, they do not.’ [14]. Even here there is a qualification: if many people do
the same diffraction experiment, with the same hole, the same screen, with particles
having the same mass and energy, they would get (with many particles) the same
diffraction pattern. There is a case to say that this qualifies as realism, but a realism
of quantum entities, propensities. So maybe the serious question now is ‘How identical
are identically prepared states?’
3 A new approach to the measurement problem
To some people, calling a photon a particle seems odd, on the grounds that it seems
nothing like an electron, which we all agree is a particle. The position coordinates of
an electron appear in Schro¨dinger’s equation while those of a photon do not appear in
Maxwell’s equation. Moreover, an electron appears to have a definite location in its
rest frame, even if this position is indeterminate in line with the uncertainty principle;
a photon has no rest frame in which to have a definite position. Perhaps this fact eases
the conscience of neo-Bohmians who point to the evident particleness of electrons etc.
in the dBB picture, and declare this to be a strength of the dBB picture. At the same
time, it makes the difficulty of dBB to treat photons in the way its treats electrons a
real problem. For a discussion of photons treated as elementary particles see Ref. [18].
But there is a perspective from which electrons and photons do share the essence of
particle-ness. I refer to the perspective in which a particle is exactly an entity that
declares one place (within the resolution of the measurer) when we ask where it is.
Photons and electrons share this property; it’s part of their being ‘screwy in exactly
the same way’ as Feynman said. This frees photons and W and Z bosons the indignity of
being in entirely different ontological categories. From this perspective, the collapse of
the wave function in a position measurement is a key aspect of the nature of a particle,
suggesting that collapsability is a key defining property of particles rather than of the
theory that governs their propagation and bound behaviour. The theory that governs
their propagation up to the point where the wave packet meets a detecting screen or
a silicon detector is standard quantum mechanics. Following the first interaction of
the particle which ‘collapses’ its momentum state, the subsequent track in the cloud
chamber is determined by predominantly forward scattering, as explained by Mott [15]
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long ago. In the case of alpha decay of a 238U nucleus that is embedded in a crystal
lattice, the alpha particle will most probably have a well defined momentum from early
on when the other particle, that is entangled with it in an S-wave, i.e. the recoiling
234Th nucleus, interacts with the lattice.
Is an alpha particle, composed of four nucleons, a ‘particle’ in the above sense? Yes.
It certainly leaves a single spot on a detecting screen etc. Within any composite par-
ticle made of fermions, such as an alpha particle, the individual fermions are strongly
entangled. The simplest possible structure will be a Slater determinant. A particle
composed of fermions will therefore have a structure at least as complex as that his-
toric entangled system: the two electrons in the helium atom. Apparently this was
one thing that made the quantum pioneers aware of the essence of entanglement long
before Schro¨dinger introduced the word generally translated as ‘entanglement’. The
characteristic of an entangled state is that the individual particles do not have a com-
plete independent set of properties. We conclude from this that a composite particle
acts as a unit, with a non-local cooperative response. In this light, the collapse of the
wave packet of a propagating alpha particle is no more surprising than electrons or
photons leaving spots when interacting with a screen, or the non-local collapse of an
entangled pair in an EPR experiment.
An important consequence of our suggested characterization of particle-ness follows if,
as has been proposed, any measurement is in essence a position measurement; this is
certainly the case for a spin measurement in a Stern-Gerlach experiment. As Bell [16]
remarked: ‘. . . in physics the only observations we must consider are position obser-
vations.’ If this is universally true, then the collapse at the core of the measurement
problem, can be viewed not just as a wave function collapse but, as a consequence of
the defining property, as proposed here, of a particle.
This proposed characterization of ‘particle’ supports a realistic interpretation in which
probabilities amount to propensities of the particles to appear in accordance with the
Born postulate. This makes the concept of ‘identically prepared states’ a key element
of QM. In fact, a basic postulate often introduced is the supposition that a second
measurement of some observable immediately after a first measurement leads to the
same result. This suggests that it is reasonable to believe that truly identically prepared
states are practical, in principle, at least. It seems likely that if the general uncertainty
principle, GUP, as derived by Robertson [17] had appeared before Heisenberg’s heuristic
argument, in which the disturbance by a ‘measurer’ is implicitly present, the subsequent
history of the interpretation of QM would have been quite different. At the heart of
the GUP are objective uncertainties which are defined in terms of expectation values
based on identically prepared states. These latter can be calculated in a simple way
from the theory, but, more importantly they could also be measured in a mechanized
way without intervention of a human measurer as part of the measurement itself. That
is, unless the designer of the equipment, which we suppose general enough to apply
in a variety of cases, can be considered a measurer (who was the measurer revealing
pleochroic haloes?). But it seems un-natural to consider this mechanical proxy as
disturbing the system in the Heisenberg sense. Of course, the key enabling concept
behind expectation values is that of identically prepared states, something that does
not appear to be sufficiently stressed in didactic works.
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4 Implications
Accepting that a particle is, by definition, an entity that appears in a single place
when ‘actualized’, suggests the language with which we describe, for example, electron
diffraction in a slit or slits, should be modified. Accordingly, we should not speak of a
particle, in the two-slit case, going through one slit or another. Rather an electron, if
that is what it is, reaches the slits. In the single slit case, the wave packet of an electron
propagates through the slit . . . unless it doesn’t because the wave packet has ‘collapsed’,
i.e. actualized, on the screen which has the slit. In that case the electron’s encounter
with the screen and slit is effectively a ‘measurement’ revealing that its position, as
it reached the screen with the slit, was never in the slit. A spot on the screen with
the slit would already reveal the particle nature of an electron. Hence, an electron is,
among other things, an entity that reveals its particle aspect when leaving a spot.
In the two-slit case leading, after the passage of many electrons, to a two-slit diffraction
pattern, the electrons that form that pattern will each have passed through both slits.
To describe this there is no need for particle-or-wave agonizing, pace Feynman: an
electron is an entity whose propagation is described by a wave, and whose appearance
is in a spot, a property that would suggest ‘particle’ in a classical context. It is better
to speak of an electron going through the two slits, in the case of a double slit, and
avoid the confusing language of a particle going through one slit, or the other slit, or
both; its particle nature will be manifest when it hits a position sensitive detector. In
short, in answer to the question ‘is it a particle or a wave?’ is: it is an electron (or
other specific particle) whose propagation is described by a wave and whose particle
nature is revealed when it is detected.
The above picture suggests that the electrical charge of a diffracted electron is not
localized until the ‘actualization’ as it leaves a spot. Hence, we may also view the wave
aspect of bound particles differently since the wave nature of an electron is not confined
to its propagation as a free particle. Consider a helium atom in a Rydberg state in which
one electron is in a ground state (strictly, the two electrons are entangled so neither
is wholly ‘ground state’ or wholly ‘Rydberg state’). In this (approximate) picture, the
highly excited Rydberg electron will ‘see’ a spherically symmetric charge density related
to |ψ|2 for the ground state electron. Likewise, in the classic Nobel prize experiments
of Hofstadter [19], which measured the size of atomic nuclei, the very high energy
electrons were deflected by a smooth charge distribution due to the nucleons. From
the pattern of the deflection of the high energy electrons, the radial charge densities
of nuclei were deduced. In fact there is a glimmer of Bohr’s complementarity idea:
the answers you get depend on the question you ask. For example, ultra high-energy
(short wavelength) incident electrons might reveal sub-nucleonic structure.
5 Final remarks
The licence for non-locality, granted by the EPR experiments that were inspired by
Bell’s inequalities, has far-reaching consequences. Together with the status of posi-
6
tion measurements, it suggests a simple interpretation of ‘measurement’ in terms of
a macroscopic event, an ‘actualization’, involving a defining property of ‘particle’: A
particle is an entity which appears at a single position when its location is established
in a macroscopic event. This applies to photons, electrons, nuclei, and (to date) quite
large molecules. Einstein in 1927 was entirely justified in being unhappy (to say the
least) with a particle, propagating as a wave, instantaneously disappearing at all but
a single spot when encountering a detecting screen. But, it seems that Bell’s analysis
of the EPR experiment provides a precedent for such non-locality. The particle-ness
of the immediate product of nuclear decay in Schro¨dinger’s famous cat thought exper-
iment leads to a macroscopic event long before the poor feline joins the experiment,
and Wigner’s friend [20] can happily report report her survival. The licence for non-
locality must also be a key element in applying the proposed nature of particles to a
3N dimensional entangled wave packet.
We conclude with the words of John Bell [21]: ”It may be that what we need is just
some small change in the point of view, and everything will fall into a coherent whole,
but it is extremely frustrating and also extremely interesting that we have not yet
found this slight change in perspective.”
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